A Critique of the Transcendental Argument for God
Introduction
The world is a wonderfully complex place - so complex, in fact, that some argue it is unintelligible without God. We rely on the scientific method to explain the world, and today we understand that lightning is an electrical discharge and not the anger of Thor.
There are some areas in which the scientific method seems to fail us. Physicists can tell us nothing about events prior to the Big Bang. Indeed, they can tell us very little about the universe for its first 380,000 years as the density of matter effectively renders it opaque. This limit of empirical knowledge has led some to look elsewhere for answers, such as philosophy or religion.
What, then, can the scientific method tell us about logic, morality, knowledge or the self? It would seem that the scientific method is inadequate to the task of explaining these phenomena.
Some theists argue that only God can account for logic, morality and knowledge. This is the basis of the Transcendental Argument for God (TAG) and Christian thinker Jay Dyer's is often held up as a compelling example.
I had not heard of TAG. Neither had I heard Dyer's version of the argument. Now that I've examined the argument, it should come as no surprise that I have opinions. Let's take a look.
The Structure
Proponents of TAG often claim it isn't a standard deductive argument and so cannot be examined in that light, insisting that it is a unique transcendental argument. However, this view fails to take into account that it is not the structure of the argument that makes it unique but its reliance on transcendental categories. When properly formalised it ends up a modus ponens argument and can be addressed as any other deductive argument.
The transcendental argument can be boiled down in the following manner.
If God does not exist, then intelligibility is impossible.
Intelligibility exists.
Therefore, God exists.
TAG commits the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent, rendering its reasoning invalid. Before we apply this reasoning to TAG, let's first examine the structure of the argument and why it fails.
It can be helpful to strip an argument of its content and examine its formal structure. TAG follows the classic fallacy of affirming the consequent, which can be represented as follows:
If P, then Q.
Q.
Therefore, P.
The argument is invalid because it assumes that a specific cause (P) is the only explanation for an observed effect (Q). Let's take this syllogism and apply it to a famous example.
If it rains, the ground will be wet. (If P, then Q)
The ground is wet. (Q)
Therefore, it rained. (Therefore, P)
The issue with the argument's structure should be immediately apparent. The fact that the ground is wet does not necessarily mean that it has rained. There could be other possible explanations. Maybe a pipe burst or someone knocked a bucket of water over.
The argument conflates the sufficient with the necessary. It falsely assumes that the sufficient conditions for intelligibility are also the necessary conditions, excluding other possibilities without justification. P is sufficient for Q but this does not imply that P is necessary for Q.
The mistake here is treating something that is sufficient for an effect as though it were the only possible cause. P may account for Q, but it does not follow that no other causes could do the same. Recognising this distinction is crucial as the argument relies on blurring the line between sufficiency and necessity.
Even if all of the premises are individually true, the conclusion can still be false, making the argument an instance of the affirming the consequent fallacy. Let us consider the following:
If someone sleeps in a tipi, then they sleep in a tent. (If P, then Q)
John sleeps in a tent. (Q)
Therefore, John sleeps in a tipi. (Therefore, P)
There are different types of tent that John could be sleeping in other than a tipi. Maybe John is sleeping in a yurt, or a geodesic tent, or a blanket pegged down over a piece of string.
Eugene Ionesco's play, Rhinoceros, contains an example of the affirming the consequent fallacy which makes its flaws obvious.
If an animal is a dog, then it has four legs.
My cat has four legs.
Therefore, my cat is a dog.
Here, the absurdity of the argument is laid bare. We could remove the word dog and plug in any other four legged animal except a cat as an antecedent to give rise to the consequent. Intuitively, we know the argument is wrong.
Having examined the structure of the argument in some detail let us now turn our attention to TAG itself to determine whether it makes this error.
The Validity of TAG
Let's remind ourselves of TAG's basic structure.
If God does not exist, then intelligibility is impossible.
Intelligibility exists.
Therefore, God exists.
Initially, the negative phrasing of the first premise may seem confusing but we can remedy that by removing redundant negatives as if we were working with a mathematical equation, bringing it in line with the examples above. Then, the first premise becomes:
If God exists, then intelligibility is possible.
What is this premise saying? It is asserting that God (P) is a necessary precondition for metaphysical phenomena such as logic, morality or epistemic knowledge (Q). It is claiming that God is the only possible cause for such phenomena. Either God is responsible for intelligibility or intelligibility is impossible. This, of course, is the informal fallacy of the false dichotomy.
A false dichotomy arises when a binary choice is presented as the only available options when alternative options exist. God is a sufficient explanation for intelligibility but so is evolution, Platonism, constructivism and phenomenology, to name a few.
The formal fallacy, affirming the consequent, makes the argument structurally invalid. The informal fallacy, the false dichotomy, makes the argument unsound. Two fallacies for the price of one!
It should be clear by now that TAG is an incoherent argument. If the formal structural flaw is not enough, the informal fallacy should be the nail in the coffin. If someone persists in the view despite having its inherent flaws pointed out then one should begin to question whether they are seeking the truth or a comforting lie.
Transcendental Spaghetti
TAG was introduced to me at the same time as Jay Dyer. He's a Christian apologist in the Orthodox tradition. His version of TAG has been cited to me as a compelling example of the argument.
In his video TAG Explained *for slow bois* (linked below) Dyer presents the following syllogism.
X is the necessary condition of Y
Y, therefore X
The format of the syllogism is a little sloppy. In the interests of clarity I'll tidy it up and to maintain consistency substitute his lettering with the one I've been using throughout this essay.
P is the necessary condition of Q
Q
Therefore, P
A brief aside here, TAG adherents like to claim that this argument form renders its structure immune from criticism. They assert that the argument cannot be invalid, only unsound. Initially, this seems compelling. However, as already noted, it is not the structure of the argument that makes it unique but its content, its reliance on transcendental categories.
This framing of the argument is no accident. It is designed to put critics of theology on the back foot. One does not simply get to assume the conclusion in the premise and claim that your argument is valid. Let's take a look at what happens if we reformat the syllogism.
If necessary condition P, then Q
Q
Therefore, P
Asserting "P is the necessary condition of Q" is functionally the same as asserting "If necessary condition P, then Q". When you frame the argument as a more traditional modus ponens its structural problems become clearer. The argument is only valid if necessity is established otherwise it is affirming the consequent.
Let us return to Dyer who rather unfortunately uses cake as an example, claiming that eggs, flour, sugar etc are necessary conditions for cake. This is not the case. One can make a sugar free, vegan chocolate cake using beetroot rather than flour. It's surprisingly tasty. However, let us grant Dyer's point for the sake of argument and assume he is referencing a genoise sponge, which does require flour, eggs, sugar and dairy.
Let's apply the syllogism to genoise sponge cakes.
Flour, eggs, sugar and dairy are a necessary condition of a genoise sponge.
There is a genoise sponge.
Therefore, flour, eggs, sugar and dairy are present.
This argument is both valid and sound. If the listed ingredients are necessary for a genoise sponge and a genoise sponge is present then it follows that the ingredients are also present.
Dyer then goes on to list items which are transcendental categories, borrowing language from Kant, in which the word refers to properties or conditions that are a priori to our experience, i.e., they are necessary for experience or knowledge to manifest.
Strangely, Dyer seems to suggest that properties which arise out of the mind are also a priori structures that are necessary for intelligibility. If one were to accept the existence of transcendental categories one would have to question the inclusion of phenomena that cannot be said to be independent of the mind, such the self or semantics.
It seems like Dyer is engaging a conceptual sleight-of-hand here and in doing so is committing a category error. He is conflating the a priori structures that allow for experience and knowledge with processes that arise from those same structures.
One cannot claim that meaning exists independently of the mind and hope to be cogent. One certainly cannot claim that meaning is a necessary precondition for experience, an a priori structure that allows for knowledge. This is simply an incoherent position.
Kant's transcendental categories, such as space and time, are conditions that make experience possible. By asserting that the self or semantics are also transcendental categories Dyer is blurring the distinction between epistemological conditions and ontological status. Concepts such as the self or meaning cannot be said to exist independently of the minds they are contingent upon.
Setting aside the category error Dyer commits let's turn our attention to what he laughingly refers to as an argument.
"...these don't operate on their own, they all work together... so how do they work together if there's not a God that holds them all together? That's the argument."
For someone who likes to accuse atheists of being intellectually bankrupt the lack of intellectual rigour on display here is astounding. In no way can a question be called an argument. To even suggest such a thing would make me question the intelligence of my interlocutor. His debate opponents should not allow him to get away with this type of sophistry.
An argument has a specific structure. In its simplest form it has two premises and a conclusion. Some arguments are compound with more than two premises leading to a conclusion. Complex, or nested arguments have multiple conclusions and premises that build on each other. There is a consistent, logical flow from premise to conclusion.
Dyer engages in a bait-and-switch. I want to be clear - I am not accusing him of being disingenuous. He could very well be arguing in good faith but even if that is the case the result is a functional bait-and-switch.
He starts the video by presenting a deductive syllogism which he then applies to cakes. However, he never applies it to God. Instead, he pivots into presuppositionalism. This is sophistry of the highest order. He has the gall to accuse atheists of having "bottom of the barrel IQ" or of being intellectually bankrupt while failing to apply intellectual rigour to his own arguments.
Why would one start by using deductive reasoning then fail to apply that reasoning to the argument one is making? Could it be that if one does apply that reasoning that the flaws in the argument are laid bare for all to see? Let's take Dyer's syllogism and apply it to TAG.
First, a recap of the argument's structure.
P is the necessary condition of Q
Q
Therefore, P
Now let's plug TAG into that structure to see if it stands up.
God is a necessary condition of intelligibility.
Intelligibility exists.
Therefore, God exists.
Straight away we can recognise the affirming the consequent fallacy. It's no surprise to me that Dyer neglects to apply his own deductive reasoning rigorously. If he were to do so the invalid nature of the argument is apparent. By switching his mode of argumentation he avoids the flaws of his deductive reasoning, instead relying on the circularity of his presuppositional position.
It is worth noting that presuppositional arguments are inherently circular. Circular logic is an informal fallacy because it assumes the conclusion in one of the premises. Consider the following:
Cake is superior to bread.
Bread is inferior to cake.
Therefore, cake is superior to bread.
The problem with circularity is that it doesn't provide any justification for the assertions made outside of the assertions themselves. Let's see what happens when we examine TAG expressed through a presuppositional lens.
Intelligibility cannot be justified in a chaotic universe without the existence of God.
Intelligibility exists.
Therefore, God exists.
The circularity is obvious. It's worth noting that the first premise is a false dichotomy: God or chaos. It fails to recognise that other justifications for intelligibility are logically possible.
Even if one were to grant the first premise the argument still fails. It makes the same mistake that Plantinga's modal ontological argument makes. It conflates the logically possible with the causally possible. This distinction is an important one to understand.
Consider the following statement. "I can run faster than the speed of light." This statement is metaphysically possible in that there is nothing inherently contradictory within the statement. It is not causally possible, i.e., it is not physically possible due to the limitations of biology and physics. The metaphysical possibility of a proposition says nothing about its ontological status.
As if the structural flaws, false dichotomies and category errors were not enough TAG has another problem: the burden of proof. The burden of proof lies with the argument and not in its refutation. Both the deductive and presuppositional framings attempts to subtly shift the burden of proof. Let's examine arguments in it's original negative formulation.
First the deductive:
If God does not exist, then intelligibility is impossible.
Intelligibility exists.
Therefore, God exists.
Now the presuppositional:
Intelligibility cannot be justified in a chaotic universe without the existence of God.
Intelligibility exists.
Therefore, God exists.
This tactic of presenting the premises in a negative format shifts the burden of proof from the argument to its refutation. By asserting that intelligibility is impossible without God it then falls on the opponent to either prove that intelligibility can exist without God or to disprove God's necessity.
Make no mistake, the burden of proof is always on the party advancing the claim, it's never on the party denying the claim. If TAG is presented in this negative framing it is perfectly legitimate to insist that the premises are restated positively thus placing the burden of proof squarely where it belongs, with the argument itself rather than its refutation. This burden-shifting is a well known debate tactic and it should be resisted. Insist upon a proper framing.
If I were being charitable I would say that Dyer has misunderstood how logic works. It would be entirely reasonable, however, given Dyer's obvious intelligence and background knowledge to assume that he is intentionally obfuscating his argument. I leave it up to the reader to make that determination for themselves.
Conclusion
TAG, whether expressed as deductive or presuppositional reasoning is an incoherent argument. When expressed deductively it fails due to its reliance on the affirming the consequent fallacy which renders the argument entirely invalid. One can dismiss the argument for this reason alone. Even if one were to ignore its structural flaws it still fails due to the false dichotomy in the first premise.
It confuses the sufficient with the necessary claiming that the sufficient conditions that allow for intelligibility are the only possible conditions that allow for it.
When expressed as a presuppositional argument it fails due to its inherent circularity. The conclusion is assumed in the premises with no justification other than the assertions themselves.
It confuses the logically possible with the causally possible, conflating metaphysics with ontology.
Jay Dyer's argumentation is superficially compelling but closer examination reveals it to be sophistry. He sets up a deductive syllogism then pivots to a presuppositional argument in a functional bait-and-switch, failing to apply his own syllogism to his own argument.
Both the deductive and presuppositional forms of the argument attempt to shift the burden of proof from the argument to its refutation by framing the premises in the negative.
Out of the arguments for God that I have encountered the transcendental one is by far the weakest. It fails on every count. Every expression of it is revealed to be incoherent when examined with any meaningful degree of rigour.
That the argument has gained such traction despite its glaring flaws suggests that its appeal lies in rhetorical point scoring rather than genuine philosophical merit.